The Europe-China Resilience Audit: Insights for advancing European resilience

• Improving resilience, defined here as the ability to manage risks without compromising long-term development, is crucial for Europe to maintain interconnectedness amid growing geopolitical volatility. It is also key for the readjustment of its relationship with China.
• Brussels has led Europe’s resilience-building efforts toward China, but its capacity is limited due to the division of competences with member states. As China-related risks are becoming more acute, stronger member state involvement is needed to extend resilience-building efforts beyond economic security.
• There is great variation in the resilience-building measures that European countries have in place, as mapped in this audit across four categories—economy, security, politics, and society— and based on 98 indicators. This lack of coherence weakens the EU’s position and overall resilience towards China.
• The Netherlands and Sweden are frontrunners in resilience building, though no single country offers a perfect model. There are practices in some countries, however, that offer valuable lessons for the EU as a whole.
• Resilience-building efforts must extend beyond policy tools; stronger political leadership and better strategic communication are also crucial to making the EU's defensive measures more credible and effective.

This MERICS Report is part of the project “Dealing with a Resurgent China” (DWARC) which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 101061700.

Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

Amid rising geopolitical uncertainty, more frequent supply-chain tensions and cases of weaponization of interdependencies, international actors are increasingly seeking greater protection from unexpected shocks and potential coercion. 

The unprecedented uptick in EU trade defense investigations over the past two years focused on Chinese products, including the high-profile anti-subsidy investigation into China-made electric vehicles, is pushing for the localization of Chinese production in Europe and diversification towards new suppliers. The EU's upcoming information and communication technology (ICT) supply-chain toolbox will address the trustworthiness of digitally connected Chinese electric vehicles, alongside a similar G7-led trustworthiness certification currently under discussion. China's export controls on graphite, gallium, and germanium have justified the diversification thresholds included in the EU’s Critical Raw Minerals Act. Such steps reflect the arrival of a new phase of globalization, where interdependence and openness are – at least in Europe – increasingly regarded as a potential source of risks that need to be managed.

These trends put building resilience, i.e. the ability to manage risks without compromising long-term development, at the heart of Europe’s adjustment of its China policy. In recent years, China-related risks have become more apparent and acute for Europe. Beijing’s actions have at times undermined Europe’s security, China’s state-guided economic system can jeopardize Europe’s competitiveness with implications for its green transition, and Beijing’s actions sometimes interfere with democratic processes. 

Besides supporting Moscow amid its invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has urged the reshaping of Europe’s security architecture, made more use of extraterritorial and coercive measures, cyberattacks, espionage, and influence operations targeting European actors. It has even sanctioned European lawmakers and institutions.

At the same time, not all engagement with China creates risks, and there are necessary and beneficial interactions that should be maintained. Heightened exchanges may increase exposure and vulnerabilities, but the response should not aim at avoiding risks at all costs by cutting ties or implementing wide bans. Such an approach would have a negative impact on Europe’s own interests. Building resilience requires a more nuanced, targeted and fact-based approach to China and China-related risks.

Top-level actors in European governments broadly agreed on that point through their support for the “de-risking, not decoupling” approach. But political statements of intention need to be translated into practical policies and bolder usage of existing instruments. This is an urgent task for Europe and one that can be put at risk by decision-making or leadership inertia at the European and national levels. 

For Europe, there is no time to lose. Beijing has long been insulating itself from external vulnerabilities, pushing for technological self-sufficiency and more ideological isolation while refining its ability to use unilateral and oftentimes opaque, extrajudicial coercive measures internationally. Already in  2014, President Xi Jinping unveiled his "comprehensive national security concept" that led to the subsequent “securitization of everything”. And his prioritization of resilience building was confirmed during the July 2024 Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which called for building “China’s strategic hinterland” and strengthening the country’s self-sufficiency. 

Under Xi, power has also become more centralized, creating a system that is better equipped and more willing to flexibly leverage dependencies for political ends. The heightened geopolitical competition with the US and socio-economic tensions domestically may encourage China to turn to such measures more frequently.

The EU has been the key platform for developing European resilience towards China. Brussels has been supporting awareness building across the bloc through dependency mappings, risk assessment frameworks and recommendations aimed at bringing issues yet to be resolved to the attention of the capitals. It has also worked on developing a range of policy instruments designed to respond to some of the main challenges facing Europe’s security, prosperity or democratic resilience. While the EU maintains a strictly country-agnostic approach to its measures, these policies largely respond to challenges posed by Beijing’s actions, or by reactions from partners like the United States. 

Still, the EU is institutionally geared towards relatively slow and inflexible legislative procedures, multilateral solutions and complex distributions of competences, whereby Brussels holds power primarily on economic matters while foreign and security affairs sit with national capitals. This often constrains rapid action to improve resilience. 

Issues pertaining to national security, and particularly the political and societal dimensions of resilience, need to be addressed by member states. As the examples of the “EU toolbox for 5G security”, the “recommendation on enhancing research security” or the recommendation for risk assessment in “critical technology areas for the EU's economic security” show, in many areas the EU can propose a common policy framework – oftentimes with support from specific member states – but implementation needs to unfold at the national level. This makes mapping the national rollout of different resilience measures all the more crucial.

The MERICS EU-China Resilience Audit provides a comparative assessment of selected European states’ vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China and their progress with introducing resilience-building measures. The audit examines 10 EU countries (Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden) and the United Kingdom, and is built on a backend database featuring 98 indicators across four domains – economy, security, politics, and society – with technology-related indicators distributed across them given their cross-cutting relevance.

This audit covers a diverse sample of European states, selected to represent various geographical regions and country sizes, and including those most influential and/or vocal on China policy. The UK serves as an external reference point that can also help evaluate the performance of EU countries compared to other partners. This allows this study to capture both overall trends, situation of and responses deployed by individual countries.

In doing so, the audit seeks to support the development of a nuanced, but coherent and actionable approach to resilience building that is rooted in targeted risk management. It implies defining the optimal approach to a particular risk along a spectrum of options:

• Avoid or resolve the risk by cutting exposure or introducing measures that effectively eliminate the probability or impact of a potential risk. Such an option may oftentimes not be feasible or desirable.
• Mitigate the risk by introducing measures or taking actions that reduce the likelihood or the level of impact of the risk.
• Transfer the risk by assigning or moving the risk to a third party.
• Accept the risk by acknowledging its existence, while consciously choosing not to deploy dedicated measures to avoid, resolve, mitigate or transfer it. This can happen, for instance, when available resources are focused on higher priority risks.

Effectively navigating  such an approach to risk management and resilience building requires three components to come together at both the EU and national levels: acquiring fact-based awareness and understanding of the nature, probability and the likely impact of different risks; developing instruments and capabilities to respond to the defined risks in an optimal way; ensuring the political leadership & coherence necessary for the deployment of the selected risk management strategy and the usage of available instruments in a credible fashion, even when that implies making trade-offs that come with economic or political costs or that might trigger a backlash.

Further, building resilience towards China requires a holistic approach. The discussion in Europe needs to avoid a “toolbox mentality” trap, focusing mostly on policy instruments while neglecting the political leadership and coherence components, and needs to be broadened beyond economic security. Other areas of resilience, including political resilience – understood as the ability to negotiate and consistently implement a well-informed long-term national strategy – or societal resilience – defined here as the ability to withstand foreign interference and protect citizens’ freedoms from external pressures – have seen less progress, as they are more susceptible to political sensitivities.

To account for the specific situation of China-relevant resilience building in Europe, the mapping of vulnerabilities and resilience-building measures carried out as part of this Resilience Audit is comparative, China-specific in nature and focuses on risks linked to deliberate actions taken by China. It does not seek to assess the overall vulnerability and resilience of the covered countries in absolute terms, nor does it claim to comprehensively cover all aspects of risk and resilience vis-à-vis China. The results of this Resilience Audit should therefore be treated as a starting point for further debates (For a more detailed explanation of this project’s conceptual framework and methodology, see the Appendix). 

European countries differ in their level of vulnerability towards China, in their risk perceptions of China, and the risk management or resilience-building strategies they deploy. This often results in an uneven implementation of resilience-building measures, including those prescribed by the EU – thus leaving the bloc overall more exposed. 

Sweden and the Netherlands appear to have invested particularly intensely in measures to build their resilience vis-à-vis China, though in many regards they still show scope for improvement. No single country offers a complete blueprint for resilience. An in-depth, targeted review across four areas (economy, security, politics, society) is beneficial, as identifying the main differences between the countries can offer specific targeted lessons or cautionary tales.

Economy

There is significant variation in levels of potential risk from direct economic relations with China across the 11 countries. Germany’s trade dependency in exports exceeds Lithuania’s by ten times (6.96 to 0.62 percent of overall exports), while Czechia is the most reliant on Chinese imports (16.35 percent, versus Lithuania's 3.41 percent).

Only five of the 11 have released public information on dependency assessments. Five countries (though different ones) also have guidelines on limiting import dependence on China in critical sectors, and four have a non-China specific measure. Only five countries have put forward export-diversification measures publicly, four without referencing China. Germany remains the only country whose official documents state an ambition to diversify economic ties and reduce dependencies on single markets or suppliers of critical goods, such as China.

On investments, Hungary is the most vulnerable, with Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) worth 2.03 percent of GDP already in 2021, with subsequent growth mostly in the battery and EV sectors, followed by Sweden (1.45 percent as a share of GDP) largely within the automotive industry. Lithuania is the least exposed, with only 0.07 percent of its GDP tied to Chinese FDI. Conversely, the Netherlands has the highest exposure to China in terms of FDI into China (3.68 percent as share of GDP), with Germany second at 2.68 percent.

While all 11 have implemented FDI screening mechanisms, the strictness of mandatory notification triggers varies; five out of 11 also fail to put alerts on all EU-recommended infrastructure sectors. These disparities hinder a unified resilience strategy, prompting the European Commission to push for further harmonization. 

Notable examples of good resilience-building measures: 

• Public diversification strategies linked to strategic sectors with high dependencies mentioning China (Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, UK); 
• Publicly available imports dependency assessment (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK).

Security

Progress has been made on critical infrastructure, where all 11 countries have measures to monitor and, potentially, block risky foreign investments. Eight of them have dedicated critical infrastructure regulations. 

Yet, China is still invested in one of the UK’s nuclear power plants and the State Grid Corporation of China holds a stake in Italy’s national electricity grid. Furthermore, Hungary’s 2024 memorandum of understanding on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with Beijing could open the door to more involvement in Hungary’s planned nuclear power plants. Chinese shipping companies have significant stakes in key terminals in about a dozen of the top three seaports in each of the countries with sea-access covered here.

On 5G regulations, while most of the 11 have restrictions on high-risk vendors, only Lithuania, Sweden and the UK have provided clear lists of specific companies deemed high-risk and therefore unsuitable, including Huawei. In 2022, the average percentage of Huawei participation in national 5G infrastructure was 34 percent, with the peak value being 72 percent in the Netherlands.

More work is needed on areas that fall outside of the more traditional security purview – such as cybersecurity or knowledge security. Only Lithuania and the UK have public guidelines restricting the usage of high-risk surveillance equipment in government buildings, and only four of the 11 have issued bans on the usage of Chinese phones and apps on governmental work equipment. Only the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have institutional solutions for knowledge security in technology R&D. 

Notable examples of good resilience measures: 

• Comparatively strict notification system and wide coverage of FDI screening mechanism (Czech Republic);
• Guidance for public institutions on restricting the usage of Chinese equipment and applications (Czech Republic, Lithuania); 
• National knowledge security institutions (Netherlands, UK); 
• National Security Strategy covers China comparatively more extensively (UK, France, Sweden); 
• Criticalities Process creating a common approach to collect and structure data on the critical national infrastructure (UK).

Politics

For many European governments, parliaments and parties, China is still not a top priority and, as such, clear objectives, strategies and coordination mechanisms are often lacking. 

Of the 11, only Germany has a publicly available China Strategy (2023), while the Netherlands released a policy paper (May 2019) and Sweden issued a government communication (September 2019). The UK government has publicly acknowledged the existence of internal guidelines on China policy, and its strategic assessment of China has been scrutinized by various Parliamentary panels. Such strategies, guidelines and statements can help cross-government alignment (though in Germany the ruling coalition’s divergences on China are an obstacle). Meanwhile, subnational engagements with China have received little attention in much of Europe.

Political parties also show low awareness or interest in China policy. Only in Germany and Lithuania do all major parties mention China in their latest electoral manifestos, even if only with brief references. Most national parliaments show little engagement with China-related affairs in parliamentary hearings, apart from a brief spike during pandemic. The UK is the exception. 

Most countries have low numbers of China experts in government-linked research organizations – though Sweden, the Netherlands and, to some extent, Poland do better. Government-funded China-focused capacity-building programs remain a rarity. 

Of the 11, those that have interacted with Chinese leaders issued far fewer readouts in English than the Chinese side (roughly 60 percent fewer) and the Netherlands does not release readouts at all. Such practices can limit transparency and the ability of member states to project their message to the public and partner countries when engaging with China, oftentimes making Chinese readouts the only publicly available source of information and thus allowing Beijing to shape the narrative. 

Notable examples of good resilience measures: 

• Dedicated national China strategies published or referenced publicly (Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK); 
• Trainings on China for governmental officials (UK); 
• Improving understanding through National China knowledge center or network (Sweden, Netherlands) and China network within national embassies around the world.

Society

Building societal resilience towards China requires more attention. Countries struggle to shield citizens and residents within their borders from the long-arm jurisdiction of the party-state. Publicly available data indicates at least 35 Chinese public security bureaus operate in the 11 countries, the majority in Italy and Spain. Yet France, Italy, Lithuania, and Spain maintain extradition treaties with China, and Czechia has one with Hong Kong. In February 2024, Hungary signed an agreement that might grant Chinese police greater freedom of operation in Budapest, although the details of the agreement remain undisclosed.

Societal resilience depends on more China knowledge and better public debate. Yet China-focused capacity-building programs are lacking. Further, there are at least around 80 European media correspondents in China, but all but around 15 of them work for UK, French, German and Dutch outlets, with several of the remaining countries having no or just a single correspondent.

Existing Russia-related capabilities could be leveraged to respond to Chinese influence operations, as most countries have dedicated units to respond to disinformation and information manipulation. Adapting their work to tackle Beijing’s activities demands significant capacity building. New channels of influence, such as TikTok, that reach a third of the population in the 11 countries as per ByteDance’s data, need to be considered. Regulating the media space is a sensitive issue that demands careful consideration.  Additionally, the experience gained in handling hostage diplomacy and exit bans with Russia could be valuable in adapting to China's tactics.

Notable examples of good resilience measures: 

• Restrictions on foreign state ownership of media (UK); 
• National funding for China research (Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK); 
• National due-diligence regulation (France, Germany, Hungary); 
• Dedicated unit for hostage diplomacy cases.

This in-depth audit confirms significant differences in vulnerabilities and progress on adopting resilience-building measures towards China between the 11 European countries covered here. While individual cases offer specific lessons and cautionary tales (see country profiles), several key takeaways apply more broadly to resilience building across the EU.

Addressing them requires structural solutions in all three fields critical for resilience and can improve China-related risk management across the entire European bloc.

Awareness and understanding

Europe needs a shared understanding in more categories of China-related risks 

The EU has been developing a common understanding of China-related economic security risks and a framework of policy responses, but a similar exercise is yet to be carried out in an equally comprehensive fashion when it comes to political and societal vulnerabilities. Work is needed to develop a common understanding of the risks in those domains and a framework for common measures in areas where member states hold the competences.

Data standardization and availability varies between the countries

Having access to accurate and comparable data is a prerequisite of effective policy solutions. But European countries still apply different methodologies and reporting standards on many issues, for instance on their dual-use exports. This may be a transparency issue, or a result of gaps in data collection practices or of insufficient capacity. Here Spain stands out for offering comprehensive and easily accessible information.

Options for action:

• Establish a structured China policy coordination framework across government institutions, with contact points in all relevant ministries to improve the information flow, help monitor ongoing exchanges with Chinese counterparts and streamline responses to incidents involving China.
• If resources are available, the above could be complemented by a network of China contact points in embassies around the world to improve understanding of how China’s activity affects national interests in third countries and through engagement with local actors, partners and Chinese counterparts. EU Delegations could potentially alleviate the lack of capacity in member states. 
  Improve situational awareness through tasking the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) by conducting annual reviews of resilience-building measures across the member states. 
• Create a uniform EU-standard format for most critical resilience-related data points at the national level. While sensitive data can remain with member states, having crucial comparable data readily available in sudden coercion cases or crises would enable faster responses. This set of indicators should be updated regularly to address evolving risks.
• Expand the Rapid Alert System, currently focused on information manipulation monitoring, to include also the systematic reporting of coercion and interference cases. Ensure that designated national contact points can gather information across the system, not just from the parts of government they are linked to. 
• Ideally, establish a process of notifying national contact points of coercion or interference instances accessible to businesses and public organizations. Over time, this system could identify patterns that warrant a coordinated European response.
• Establish a China Resilience Advisory Board at the national and European levels including businesses, research institutions, and selected civil society representatives. These boards could help work on existing vulnerabilities and provide input in policy development process. The trust built through such frameworks could help governments convince other actors to share data on their activities that might otherwise be hard to obtain.

Instruments and capabilities

Implementation of resilience policies has been uneven across Europe

Member states performed better and more consistently on resilience-building measures in areas where the EU has competence and has pushed for specific policies, though even there, divergences persist. The lack of consistency in the build-up of resilience within Europe creates entry points for Beijing to exploit.

Progress among the 11 countries analyzed here has been lagging or uneven in, among other areas:

• Implementation of FDI screening mechanisms, particularly the thresholds for notification procedures and coverage of critical sectors.
• Dual-use export controls vary in their level of strictness.
• Introduction of knowledge security guidelines and institutions.
• Guidelines on subnational engagement with China are lacking.
• Official regulations on the usage of high-risk equipment and software by civil servants and public offices are lacking in most countries.
• Not all countries have suspended extradition treaties with China and/or Hong Kong.

There are still too few China-related human and institutional resources 

Most of the analyzed countries lag on systemic efforts to build capacity and awareness on China within the administration and the wider research and advisory arena. This hampers their ability to detect China-related risks and develop more efficient responses. Most countries do not have dedicated competence-building schemes for public officials, dedicated funding for China research, or have low numbers of staff within the ministries assigned to managing the ever-expanding China-related portfolios. This challenge is especially acute in smaller member states. 

Options for action:

• Develop knowledge security measures and guidelines for subnational level engagement to minimize the risk of sensitive knowledge transfers.
• Bolster measures to shield European citizens and residents from China’s long-arm jurisdiction. Engage Chinese diaspora and nationals with Chinese heritage to co-create structures to support targeted communities, suspend extradition treaties with China and consider creating a national team for dealing with potential hostage diplomacy cases (including exit bans).
• Review the resilience-building measures already implemented in the national system with a focus on Russia, which can offer lessons or serve as a basis for establishing similar systems to manage China-related risks.
• Establish dedicated China-related trainings and crisis-scenario workshops to expand the awareness of China-related risks across the administration. Potential inspiration can be provided for instance by the FCDO-linked Great Britain–China Centre’s trainings for UK officials.
• Conduct regular assessments of the rollout of and compliance with resilience-related policy measures across the EU, as the one conducted by the EU Court of Auditors in the case of FDI screening mechanism. This can help develop a completer and more granular picture of the existence and strictness of regulations across member states. 

Political leadership and coherence

Countries lack clarity of priorities and effective strategic communication regarding China policies, limiting their political resilience

Most of the 11 analyzed countries lack clear strategic documents on China policy. Only Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have published China strategies or communications, with many countries not even having broader Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific strategies. Most of the analyzed countries also released readouts in English from less than 40 percent of meetings with Chinese leaders, whereas China issues regular readouts that are used to shape political narratives.

Countries tend to pursue a reactive, cost-averse approach to resilience-building

Taking action only when the materialization of a risk is apparent limits the scope for preventive resilience. Many of the 11 lack a public import dependency assessment or dedicated diversification plans to enable coordination between government and business actors. The reluctance to act on 5G guidelines is one example of a wider problem in building resilience: Countries tend to favor inaction if the likelihood of risks materializing is considered low, if they have not yet experienced the concrete impact of similar risks, or if they consider potential retaliation from China to be likely and costly,

Focusing only on policy instruments is not enough

Some countries have introduced robust resilience-building legislation, but qualitative analyses of their relations with China shows this is not enough. For instance, Hungary has strong resilience legislation which has not changed its policy practices: it is still actively seeking closer political and economic ties with China while challenging resilience-building measures in Europe. Another challenge is limited political will to act, which hinders Europe’s ability to develop preventive policies rather than only reacting when unfolding crises generate political momentum. But ensuring that taking such oftentimes costly measures is politically possible for European politicians requires a nuanced public debate that also includes businesses, experts, civil society and diaspora communities.

Options for action:

• Improve strategic clarity of objectives by developing – public or internal – national China or Indo-Pacific strategies or sets of guidelines in a process of coordination across the administration and in conversation with key business, research and civil society stakeholders. This would help define long-term visions, priorities and acceptable trade-offs, allowing countries to maintain their course when facing pressure and uncertainties. 
• Ensure a clear communication of objectives and priorities ahead of major state visits and high-profile engagements. Improve the timely release of comprehensive readouts from such exchanges to limit Beijing’s capacity to drive the narrative.
• Unless already done, introduce the “cost of inaction” category (measuring the potential long-term costs of neglecting specific risks), alongside assessments of China’s likely retaliation to defensive measures, into internal policy-option assessments. Such an approach can support political decision-makers in assessing the necessary trade-offs and selecting the optimal strategy to deal with China-related risks (mitigation, avoidance, transfer, acceptance).
• Establish linkages between the China Delegation within the European Parliament and their national counterparts to create debates on similar China-related topics across the EU and help facilitate greater democratic oversight of China policies through the legislatures.
• Support a more nuanced China-related debate in the public sphere that can prepare the public for the potential need for assertive and cost-inducing measures while ensuring diaspora groups are not targeted. This can be achieved through measures such as deliberate and consistent rhetoric during press conferences or increasing the number of foreign correspondents to China from public media.

Appendix 1: Definitions and methodology

This audit was conducted based on a backend database featuring 98 indicators across four domains—economy, security, politics, and society (with technology-related indicators distributed across them given their cross-cutting relevance). It examines 10 EU countries (Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden) and the United Kingdom.

The vulnerability indicators and resilience-building indicators were defined through a three-stage process that took risk-mapping as the starting point. It included discussions with and feedback from several European experts to minimize the individual biases of the authors.

• Defining risks: Identifying potential negative impacts that can be inflicted by China on Europe in reference to core European interests and the pillars of the EU's security, prosperity, and stability.
• Analyzing means: Understanding the tactics, channels and tools available to China, based on its past disruptive behaviors, and existing policy tools and legislation.
• Developing indicators: Creating indicators to assess countries' vulnerabilities to the defined means and evaluating the resilience-building measures deployed to increase the costs or hinder China’s ability to deploy those means.

The indicators were then organized into groups under four domains further differentiated into sub-groups.

• Economy: demand from China; supplies from China; Chinese investments in EU; EU investments in China.
• Security: critical infrastructure; knowledge and tech security & arms and tech transfers; military and law enforcement cooperation.
• Politics: unity and cohesion; policymaking and implementation; image and reputation.
• Society: discourse shaping; suppression of debates and interference; legitimacy and credibility.

Countries were assigned scores on the basis of their comparative vulnerability and resilience in the context of specific indicators. However, only overall scores are shared in each category, as individual indicators by themselves do not paint the full picture and the exposure of the full set of a country’s unmitigated vulnerabilities could in itself generate risks if misused.

This quantitative exercise was complemented by qualitative analyses of cross-cutting issues and dedicated national level resilience assessments towards China that help to contextualize the results. These serve to capture the ongoing political debate in which the resilience assessment is taking place both at the EU and international level, as well as within the 11 mapped countries. 

The objective of this study is to help identify and grapple with the scope of the challenge that lies ahead for Europe as it builds up its resilience towards China, and to suggest some ideas for effective and realistic ways forward. The project aims to stimulate progress by highlighting both best practices and gaps in responses. 

The exercise is comparative, China-specific in nature and focuses on risks linked to deliberate actions taken by China. It does not seek to assess the overall vulnerability and resilience of the covered countries in absolute terms. The benchmark score for each indicator was set by the highest vulnerability or resilience among the covered countries and is as such not applicable beyond Europe and this group of countries.

The data gathered for this exercise pertains to the period of 2019 – 2024 (with adjustments for selected indicators based on data availability or the distorting effects of extraordinary circumstances – e.g. the Covid-19 pandemic). Data was collected from publicly accessible sources and interviews. It does not include resilience-building work potentially carried out by members states internally.

Additionally, there are limits to this study’s ability to directly and objectively quantify some aspects of resilience, such as political leadership or the will to make use of existing policy tools. In some cases, this study has relied on proxy indicators to assess each country’s progress. In others, assessments must necessarily include qualitative analyses accounting for the specific conditions in each country and policy area, such as those in the country profiles releases as part of this project and reviewed by national experts.

Appendix 2: List of indicators of vulnerability and of resilience-building measures

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to extend their gratitude to the colleagues who contributed to the project by sharing valuable insights, sharing their findings or providing feedback on components of the MERICS Europe-China Resilience Audit: Francesca Ghiretti, Leo Clyne, Lewin Jander, Anna-Lena Nolte, Daniel Weise, Leonhard Xu, Clark N. Banach and the BLOCS Lab at Aletheia Research Institution, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Mario Esteban, Filippo Fasulo, Alicia García-Herrero, Ingrid d'Hooghe, Jakub Jakóbowski, Tomasz Kamiński, Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska and Michał Gzik (Project “The Role of Cities in the European Union Policy Towards China” funded by Poland’s National Science Centre), Ivana Karásková, Támas Matura, Charles Parton, Alexis von Sydow and Helena Löfgren.